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THE "SOPHIE'S CHOICE" PARADOX AND THE
DIscONTINuous SELF: TWO COMMENTS ON
WERTHEIMER
JENNIFER GERARDA BROWN*

I. INTRODUCTION

In this Symposium,' Alan Wertheimer weighs some of the standard arguments for and against the enforceability of surrogacy contracts, the agreements
through which women bind themselves to carry, give birth to, and then surrender children.2 My response to Wertheimer is twofold. First, I will challenge
what may be an underlying assumption of his argument, that increasing a
person's menu of choices is always desirable. Second, I will challenge his
assertion that a woman's preferences and identity throughout the process of
pregnancy and childbirth are sufficiently static that her agreement to surrender
the child-made prior to pregnancy--can bind her after the child is born.
First, I will address the desirability of choice. In his article on surrogacy,
Wertheimer recites a "familiar response" to claims of coercion: "surrogacy
offers women an additional option to their present menu of choices, and the
addition of options to one's menu of choices is always freedom enhancing
rather than coercive." 3 Wertheimer elaborates, "[i]f a woman can reasonably
regard surrogacy as improving her overall welfare given that society has unjustly limited her options, it is arguable that it would be adding insult to injury
to deny her that opportunity." 4 Thus, Wertheimer may implicitly adopt the assumption that runs through much of contract theory and economic analysis of
law: that more choice is always good, and that increasing people's choices can
never be undesirable. But this assumption may not be well-founded in all
cases. For some people in a specific set of circumstances, choice may be
undesirable. If this is true, the undesirability of choice may present a new and
distinct rationale for restricting freedom of contact.
I will argue that under at least one set of circumstances-circumstances I
will refer to as "Sophie's Choice" preferences-people might prefer one or all

* Professor of Law, Quinnipiac College School of Law. A.B., Bryn Mawr College, 1982;
J.D., University of Illinois, 1985. I am grateful to Ian Ayres, Brian Bix, Wendy Gordon, Linda
Meyer, and Carol Sanger for extremely helpful comments and conversations.
1. Symposium, Coercion: An InterdisciplinaryExamination of Coercion,Exploitation, and
the Law, 74 DENY. U. L. REv. 875 (1997).
2. Alan Wertheimer, Remarks on Coercion and Exploitation, 74 DENy. U. L. REV. 889
(1997) [hereinafter Wertheimer, Remarks]; Alan Wertheimer, Exploitation and Commercial Surrogacy, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 1215 (1997) [hereinafter Wertheimer, Surrogacy].
3. Wertheimer, Surrogacy, supra note 2, at 1221-22.
4. Id. at 1223.
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of the available alternatives to a choice between those alternatives. 5 The possibility. of "Sophie's Choice" preferences represents a distinct rationale for restricting freedom of choice, including freedom of contract.
In the second part of this article, I will respond to the comparison
Wertheimer draws between childbirth and other life transformative processes,
such as plastic surgery, abortion, or marriage. My critique of Wertheimer will
be theoretical and empirical.
,emeticaly,
I will argue that Wertheimer himself falls prey to what he calls the "fallacy of equivocation" when he discusses
consent in these various contexts. The "consent" one gives to his examples of
transformative processes-abortion, plastic surgery, sterilization, or sex change
surgery-has a fundamentally different effect from that which he would give
consent to surrogacy. In Wertheimer's examples, the consent merely insulates
others from tort liability: even if the patient later regrets an abortion, for example, the doctor who performs it will be free of liability if the patient gave
informed consent. But that consent, however well informed, could not be used
to force the patient to go through with the abortion if, just before the procedure began, she had second thoughts. Consent that insulates from tort liability
would not necessarily support an award of specific performance, and yet
Wertheimer seems to argue that the two kinds of consent are not significantly
distinct.
Empirically, I will argue that Wertheimer compares childbirth to inapposite examples of life transformative experiences. I will specifically explore the
stability of identity throughout pregnancy and childbirth. It seems almost axiomatic that people can be contractually bound only if they or their agents bind
them. I will argue that in the context of surrogacy, this bedrock principle of
contract law may serve as a rationale for the voiding of the surrogacy contract
at the mother's option. The process of carrying and giving birth to a child so
fundamentally changes a woman-physically, emotionally, and socially-that
her very identity may change. The woman who emerges from the labor and
delivery room is in a real way not the same woman who entered the surrogacy
contract ten or more months before. Because of this discontinuity of identity,
the prepregnant woman cannot bind the mother.
II. THE SopHIE's CHOICE PARADox

To explain the dynamic I am labeling "Sophie's Choice," I will describe
the paradox, beginning with its original context, William Styron's Sophie's
Choice. I will explain why the Sophie's Choice paradox is distinguishable
from other rationales for limiting choice. Finally, I will explore potential causes and implications of the paradox.

5. 1 name these situations "Sophie's Choice" in honor of the William Styron novel by that
title. WniIAM STYRON, SoPHm's CuoicE (1966).
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A. Sophie's Choice: The Basic Definition
The classic example of a person for whom choice was not desirable-for
whom, indeed, being given a choice caused continuing agony for the rest of
her life-is the character of Sophie Zawistowska in William Styron's novel,
Sophie's Choice. I could not possibly paraphrase the novel without losing the
power of Styron's insight, and thus I will quote at length the scene which
gives rise to the novel's title. Sophie has just been transported to Auschwitz
with her young children, Jan and Eva. The scene unfolds as she stands with
the children on the train platform undergoing "selection," in which a doctor
will decide whether she and the children should be immediately sent to gas
chambers or kept in the camp for slave labor.
But here she was, and here was the doctor .... She sensed from
his manner, his gaze-the new look in his eye of luminous intensity-that everything she was saying, far from helping her, from protecting her, was leading somehow to her swift undoing. She thought:
Let me be struck dumb.
The doctor was a little unsteady on his feet. He leaned over for a
moment to an enlisted underling with a clipboard and murmured
something, meanwhile absorbedly picking his nose. Eva, pressing
heavily against Sophie's leg, began to cry. "So you believe in Christ
the Redeemer?" the doctor said in a thick-tongued but oddly abstract
voice, like that of a lecturer examining the delicately shaded facet of
a proposition in logic. Then he said something which for an instant
was totally mystifying: "Did He not say, 'Suffer the little children to
come unto Me'?" He turned back to her, moving with the twitchy
methodicalness of a drunk.
Sophie, with an inanity poised on her tongue and choked with
fear, was about to attempt a reply when the doctor said, "You may
keep one of your children."
"Bitte?" said Sophie.
"You may keep one of your children," he repeated. "The other
one will have to go. Which one will you keep?"
"You mean, I have to choose?"
"You're a Polack, not a Yid. That gives you a privilege-a
choice."
Her thought processes dwindled, ceased. Then she felt her legs
crumble. "I can't choose! I can't choose!" She began to scream. Oh
how she recalled her own screams! Tormented angels never screeched
so loudly above hell's pandemonium. "Ich Kann nicht wihlen!" she
screamed.
The doctor was aware of unwanted attention. "Shut up!" he ordered. "Hurry now and choose. Choose, goddamnit, or I'll send them
both over there. Quick!"
She could not believe any of this. She could not believe that she
was now kneeling on the hurtful, abrading concrete, drawing her
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children toward her so smotheringly tight that she felt that their flesh
might be engrafted to hers even through layers of clothes. Her disbelief was total, deranged. It was disbelief reflected in the eyes of the
gaunt, waxy-skinned young Rottenfihrer, the doctor's aide, to whom
she inexplicably found herself looking upward in supplication. He appeared stunned, and he returned her gaze with a wide-eyed baffled
expression, as if to say: I can't understand this either.
"Don't make me choose," she heard herself plead in a whisper,
"I can't choose."
"Send them both over there, then," the doctor said to the aide,
"nach links."
"Mama!" She heard Eva's thin but soaring cry at the instant that
she thrust the child away from her and rose from the concrete with a
clumsy stumbling motion. "Take the baby!" she called out. "Take my
little girl!"
At this point the aide-with a careful gentleness that Sophie
would try without success to forget-tugged at Eva's hand and led
her away into the waiting legion of the danned. She would forever
retain a dim impression that the child had continued to look back,
beseeching. But because she was now almost completely blinded by
salty, thick, copious tears she was spared whatever expression Eva
wore, and she was always grateful for that. For in the bleakest honesty of her heart she knew that she would never have been able to
tolerate it, driven nearly mad as she was by her last glimpse of that
vanishing small form.6
For purposes of discussion in this article, I will abstract away from the
specific facts of Sophie's fictional choice in an attempt to capture the paradoxical nature of her situation, a paradox that might be repeated in other
situations presenting a "choice" to contracting parties. Excluding some elements of Styron's formulation from the analysis might give rise to other perversities, and a more general definition of the paradox helps to identify the
core preferences or elements that would justify restricting freedom of contract.
In the novel, Sophie really had three alternatives. She could remain silent,
she could surrender her boy, or she could offer the girl to be killed. The default was that both children would be killed, so that inaction or silence meant
death for both the boy and girl (see Figure One). This default had a decisionforcing quality,' because it clearly appeared to be worse than either of the

6. Id. at 482-84.
7. Carol Sanger has suggested that this was not a "choice" at all. See Carol Sanger, Separating From Children, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 375, 426 (1996) (citing Holocaust historian Lawrence
Langer, who refers to this as a "choiceless choice").
8. Ian Ayres and Robert Gertier would describe this as a "penalty default." They argue that
such penalty defaults can be efficient, because they induce parties to contract for arrangements
that are better tailored to their relationship (than either a penalty or neutral default would be). Ian
Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 97 (1989). Algebraically, Ayres & Gertner conceive the order of choices
PD < D < NP where PD is the value of the penalty default to the parties, D is the value that an
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alternatives Sophie was being asked to choose between. In other words,
Sophie would clearly prefer to have only one of her children killed rather than
losing both of them to Birkenau's gas chambers. To begin with let us assume
that she loved her children equally. In such as case, we could present Sophie's
initial preferences as BG < B = G, where BG represents the death of both
children, B is the death of the boy and G is the death of the girl.
FIGURE ONE
ORIGINAL SOPHIE'S CHOICE (INACTION = BG)

9

But so far we have ignored Sophie's preferences about choosing. The
motive force behind the narrative-indeed the element that makes the doctor's
"offer" so evil-is that Sophie wants not to choose between her children. That
choice might prove so painful, in fact, that she would rather someone else
decide which of her children should live or die. Algebraically, one might
express Sophie's preferences as BG < C < B = G, where C is the choice between children. This arrangement of preferences would give rise to what I will
call a "weak form" Sophie's Choice paradox. In the "weak form" of the paradox, Sophie prefers one of the alternatives to having a choice between the
alternatives. Or to put it another way, Sophie values the choice between alternatives less than at least one of the alternatives available to her.
If the choice between children proves sufficiently painful, Sophie might
even prefer that the doctor simply kill both of her children rather than force
her to choose between them. She might prefer, in other words, that the deci-

ordinary default might have, and NP is the value of a negotiated provision. Id. When these are the
parties' valuations and the penalty default induces negotiation where an ordinary default would
not, it can be value maximizing. Id. Sophie's Choice may give some basis for questioning Ayres
and Gertner's enthusiasm for penalty defaults, however, because it provides at least one example
in which the equivalent of NP-that is, the exercise of choice-will hold less value than an ordinary default would. The situation created by the penalty default under such circumstances, then,
will not necessarily enhance value, because it may force negotiation/choice in circumstances where
NP < D. If the default were more neutral, exacting no special penalty (e.g., boy or girl dies, but
not both), Sophie might not feel as pressured to choose and would be spared some of the disutility
that accompanies choice.
9. Figure One represents Sophie's choice in game theoretic terms, where Sophie can choose
her son to die ("B"), choose her daughter to die ("G"), or refuse to choose, in which case her
inaction will lead to the death of both children ("BG").
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sion be completely taken from her hands. When a person prefers all of the
proffered alternatives to being given a choice between those alternatives, the
situation gives rise to what I will call a "strong form" Sophie's Choice paradox. The algebraic expression of such preference arrangement is as follows: C
<BG < B G.
A slight alteration of Styron's facts eliminates the decision-forcing quality
of the status quo default and might create a strong form Sophie's Choice paradox. The altered version demonstrates that the existence of a Sophie's Choice
paradox does not turn on the presentation of a penalty default. In this scenario,
the doctor says that he will kill Sophie's son, but she can save his life if she
allows the doctor instead to kill her daughter (see Figure Two). In this formulation, one child (but only one child) will die either way. Sophie may have no
clear preference as between her children (so that being given the choice to kill
the daughter instead of the son gives her no value).'0 Substantively, then, the
choice is not more valuable than the status quo default. Procedurally, however,
she suffers more if forced to choose than if the doctor simply kills one or the
other of her children. Algebraically, this formulation looks like this: C2 < B =
G.
FIGURE TWO
MODIFIED SOPHIE'S CHOICE (INACTION = B)"

Of course, the choice that Styron writes about and the choice given
Sophie in the altered version are not the same. If we label the Styron version
C, and the altered version C, it may be that C, < C, because silence in the
face of C2 will not result in clearly greater harm than articulating a choice
(thus giving Sophie the chance to avoid responsibility by remaining silent),
while silence in the face of C, will cause greater harm than choosing (silence
will cause both children to die). This makes the abdication of responsibility
through silence a less viable alternative in C,. But the fact that Sophie would
probably prefer C2 to C, certainly does not mean that she would prefer C2 to
the status quo.

10. It is also possible that Sophie does prefer one child over the other, and I explore this
possibility below. See infra Part fI.B.2.
11. Figure Two represents the altered form of Sophie's choice, where Sophie can choose between inaction, where her son dies (''), or her daughter dies ('N"G).
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I draw the distinction between the strong and weak form Sophie's Choice
paradox because a public policy response to the paradox will be easier with
the strong form than with the weak. In cases where people have strong form
preferences, it will be easy for policymakers to forge- a value-enhancing rule.
Even flipping a coin between the alternatives will increase value, since people
prefer any alternative to choosing between alternatives. If people have weak
form preferences, on the other hand, policymakers face the more difficult task
of determining which among the alternatives is preferred over choice.
Policymakers will improve people's situations only by selecting the right alternative as the default, not by simply eliminating the choice. If they choose
badly, policymakers can leave people worse off by eliminating choice. The
distinction between the strong and weak forms of the paradox is also useful
because it suggests minimal requirements for some governmental intervention.
The strong form makes the case for intervention easy. If people have only
weak form preferences in a given situation, governmental intervention might
still be a good idea, but a little trickier.
The altered version of Sophie's Choice allows us to highlight the core of
the paradox: someone may prefer any alternative to actually having a choice
between alternatives. This paradox flies in the face of most economic theory
and upsets the general view that choices are freedom-enhancing and therefore
desirable. 2
B. Other Examples
But does the Sophie's Choice paradox arise in the real world? I will explore this issue further below, but consider as an initial example the situation
that arose when the state of California began to permit people given the death
penalty to choose the mode of execution. The state gave inmates this choice in
response to claims that the death penalty was cruel and unusual punishment. It
is possible, of course, that giving condemned inmates a choice between punishments did make the punishment less cruel. 3 But it is also possible that
forcing people to decide the mode of their own killing added another layer of
suffering to the process.

12. There may be a final element of the paradox that requires clarification here. Unlike some
other examples of coercion discussed in this Symposium, see, e.g., Ian Ayres, The Twin Faces of
Judicial Corruption: Extortion and Bribery, 74 DENv. U. L. REv. 1231 (1997), the person proposing the alternatives should remain constant, and should always be the doctor. We would not
expect to hear Sophie speak first, offering her daughter to be killed if the doctor will only spare
her son. If Sophie were to make such an offer, our intuition likely would not be that she was coerced, and the making of such an offer would also dispel the sense that is central to the paradox-the conclusion that less choice is better than more. In this sense, Sophie's situation is distinguishable from examples in which an extortion victim offers, "please let me pay you $100 to
forego hitting me," and the offer is consistent with the conclusion that the person is nonetheless a
victim of extortion.
13. Robert Alton Harris brought the court challenge that ultimately permitted him to choose
the mode of his execution. This argument that choice can hurt inmates might be in some tension
with a more general sense that inmates (like the Nuremburg defendants) "cheat the executioner"
by committing suicide--exercising the ultimate power over their own deaths. It may be too difficult to discern whether a particular inmate is one who would be harmed or helped by receiving a
choice about how to die.
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Wertheimer himself suggests another situation in which the Sophie's
Choice paradox might obtain. In "Norplant," a judge tells a convicted defendant that she will receive probation for her drug offense but only if she allows
a doctor to implant the contraceptive Norplant in her arm. 4 The hypothetical
may present a Sophie's Choice situation because the defendant in Norplant
might prefer not to choose between liberty and fertility. 5
In other contexts, courts have certainly recognized that some choices are
simply too painful to be tolerated, even if they do expand the range of options
from an initial status quo. For example, an employer could not legally force
employees to "choose" between job benefits and observing religious regulations, such as the prohibition against work on Saturdays imposed by Seventh
Day Adventists. 6 The concept of "unconstitutional conditions" may also be
based in part upon the underlying premise that some choices ought not to be
given to people. 7
C. What Sophie's Choice is Not
My thesis is that the Sophie's Choice paradox presents a new and independent basis for restricting freedom of choice, including freedom of contract.
In this section, I will discuss and distinguish seven other traditional rationales
for restricting freedom of choice.
1. Sophie's Choice does not require the presentation of a penalty default.
Despite the fact that Styron presented it that way, the paradox of Sophie's
Choice does not turn on the existence of a penalty default. As we saw above
in the version of the facts slightly altered from Styron's narrative, Sophie
would prefer not to choose between her children even (perhaps especially) if
the status quo is that only one rather than both of the children must die. Thus,
the paradox does not depend upon an agent making the undesirable choice in
order to avoid a more costly alternative.
2. Sophie's Choice does not require an immoral baseline.
Again, despite the fact that Styron presented it this way, the paradox does
not turn on the status quo being immoral. The novel is particularly dramatic
because the status quo there did not stem from a "moralized baseline," in the
words of Alan Wertheimer. Sophie's moralized baseline would dictate that
neither child should die. In the novel, then, both the status quo and the

14. Wertheimer, Remarks, supra note 2, at 896.
15. For a "real world" case that closely resembles the Norplant hypothetical, see Man Accused of Missing Vasectomy, NEw HAVEN REG., March 25, 1997, at All (25 year-old defendant
pled guilty to lewd and lascivious conduct because he impregnated a 15 year-old girl; he served a
year in jail and agreed to have a vasectomy within 90 days as a condition of probation; after an
unsuccessful attempt to have the vasectomy agreement dropped, he refused to go through with it
and now faces 17 years in prison if a judge decides he violated the terms of his probation).
16.

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963).

17. William P. Marshall, Towards a Nonunifying Theory of UnconstitutionalConditions: The
Example of the Religion Clauses, 26 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 243 (1989).
18. Wertheimer, Remarks, supra note 2, at 900.
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doctor's proposal are clearly worse than her moralized baseline. But even in
cases where the status quo is moral, a person might still prefer not to choose
between that status quo and a proposed alternative.
For example, in Wertheimer's Norplant example, 9 the judge can legitimately sentence the convicted drug offender to a prison term. The defendant
can avoid incarceration by submitting to the implantation of Norplant. The
Norplant example is distinguishable from Styron's version of Sophie's Choice
because the status quo (imposing a prison term) is moral, but the hypothetical
illustrates that the Sophie's Choice paradox can exist even without an immoral
baseline.
Sometimes a Sophie's Choice situation could be created by nature. Suppose that the Titanic is sinking and that Sophie and her children are passengers. Sophie is needed on a lifeboat because she has certain navigational skills
that her fellow passengers value, but the lifeboat has room for only one more
person, and Sophie is asked to choose which of her children to include. Nature-rather than the law or the humans who write it-has created the situation presenting this choice. But even when the choice is not created by people,
Sophie might prefer not to choose. Situations giving rise to the Sophie's
Choice paradox can be caused by good, bad, or no law.2
3. Sophie's Choice does not turn on whether the alternative are framed as
gains or losses.
The paradox does not require a choice between unpalatable alternatives.
We might imagine a situation in which a choice between positive, desirable
alternatives might also raise problems. Suppose that a family with two children-a boy and a girl-were to receive a grant that would finance one child's
college education, but only at Harvard. At a time when Harvard would admit
only men, it would be clear that the son would receive the money. But when
Harvard becomes coeducational, the situation may present a painful choice.
The parent might prefer the days of single sex education where no choice was
necessary, or she might prefer that a third party simply decide for her.

19. Id. at 896.
20. Wertheimer has suggested that the presence of an immoral benchmark can distinguish
threats from offers. Robert Nozick says that threats and offers can be distinguished by asking
whether the person would choose to have the choice presented:
the crucial difference between acting because of an offer and acting because of a threat
vis a vis whose choice it is, etc., is that in one case (the offer case) the Rational Man is
normally willing to move or be moved from the presituation to the situation itself,
whereas in the other case (the threat case) he is not. Put baldly and too simply, the Rational Man would normally (be willing to) choose to make the choice among the alternatives facing him in the offer situation, whereas normally be would not (be willing to)
choose to make the choice among the alternatives facing him in the threat situation.
Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, ScIENcE AND METHOD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ERNEST

NAGEL 459 (1969).
Sophie's Choice defies both of these formulations. The presentation of alternatives may be
coming from a moral benchmark (an offer according to Wertheimer), but the person might prefer
not to have the choice (a threat in Nozick's view). In this way, the Sophie's Choice paradox complicates the distinction between threats and offers.
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4. Sophie's Choice does not require that the choice create externalities.
Although the presence of externalities is a common rationale for restricting freedom of contract, the Sophie's Choice paradox suggests that we might
want to restrict choice even in the absence of externalities. The alternatives
presented need not hurt others outside the contracting relationship. The paradox arises because of the pain of choosing, and those costs are internalized to
the chooser.2 '

5. Sophie's Choice does not require that the chooser's preferences be
suspect.
A traditional rationale for restricting freedom of choice is paternalism: a
belief that the government may know better than individuals what is good for
them. But the Sophie's Choice paradox does not require that we fear the offeree will make the wrong choice, that she might choose the proposed alternative
rather than the default despite its lower value to her.
The government might paternalistically choose for people when the outcomes of various choices are so uncertain that people are disabled from making the choices themselves. But the Sophie's Choice paradox can arise even
in situations where outcomes are certain. Even when outcomes are certain and
people's preferences are respectable, they might prefer not to choose between
proffered alternatives.
6. Sophie's Choice does
preferences.

not turn on the existence of unstable

Another form of hand-tying occurs in the presence of dynamically unstable preferences. In the classic (and most literal) case of hand-tying, Ulysses
fears there will be a time in the future when his preferences will change, that
he will be tempted by the Sirens in ways he now knows will be destructive.
His present self wants to tie the hands of the future self because he does not
trust his future self to have his long-term interests at heart. Jon Elster explains
that "binding oneself is a privileged way of resolving the problem of weakness
of will; the main technique for achieving rationality by indirect means."23
But the preferences of Sophie and those who stand in her shoes can be
stable for eternity. The pain of the paradox does not turn on instability of
preferences, but on being forced to choose something. Sophie might want to
tie her own hands, but not to prevent a bad choice by a future self, because

21. This may not be entirely true. It may be the fear of causing such horrible
externalities-harming one or the other child, and knowing that the doomed child can have no say
in the decision-that causes a good bit of Sophie's pain in choosing. Less classic formulations of
the paradox, such as the Norplant example, present fewer if any externalities, because the person
making the choice is the one who will absorb all the costs and benefits of the choice. Here again,
however, some of the pain of choosing may be caused by a recognition of externalities, as might
arise if the defendant were married to someone who badly wanted to have a baby.
22. Gerald Dworkin has argued that "if one is faced with the two doors behind which are the
famous lady and the tiger, one does not want one's choices increased by adding three more doors
behind all of which are tigers. We are only concerned with options, each of which is known to the
chooser." GERALD DwoRIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AuTONOMY 65 (1988).
23. JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SmENs 37 (1979).

1997]

THE "SOPHIE'S CHOICE" PARADOX

1265

she has no reason to think her future self would choose any differently from
her present self. Rather, she might want to tie her hands to avoid having to
make a choice altogether. 4 Sophie's Choice is therefore distinguishable from
regret. In the case of Sophie's Choice, the only regret is that she had to
choose, not the actual choice she made.' This is not the Ulysses problem,
because the chooser's preferences are stable.'
7. Sophie's Choice does turn on the elimination of options as a
precommitment device.
The Sophie's Choice paradox should be distinguished from situations in
which people seek to increase leverage in negotiation by tying their own
hands. Tom Schelling has suggested that negotiators might restrict their own
choices in order to affect the behavior of others.27 By precommitting to third
parties, for example, a negotiator can tie his own hands to prevent deviations
from those outside commitments. Hand-tying in the Schelling sense thus becomes a way of making true what the negotiator wants to be true (e.g., that he
cannot pay more than a given amount for something), weakening the other
party's ability to negotiate against this point.
This form of hand-tying-and the way it seeks to disempower the party
from making a future choice-is distinguishable from Sophie's situation because it is a strategic move designed to elicit concessions from the other side.
In Schelling's model, the negotiator ties her hands by precommitting to something that she clearly prefers (at least at the point of the hand-tying) to the
concessions she might otherwise be forced to make. In Sophie's case, she
might want to disable herself from making future choices, but she would do
this merely to avoid a choice between the status quo and the proffered alternative that will be too painful to make, rather than to force concessions from the
other side or to increase the likelihood that she will achieve a result she clearly prefers.

24. But see infra notes 44-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of a second order
Sophie's Choice problem.
25. One could therefore say that Sophie's regret is procedural rather than substantive.
26. While either shifting preferences or Sophie's Choice preferences might lead people to
avoid choice, an example might reveal the strong relationship between them. As one story has it,
someone tried once to bribe Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln dismissed the would be briber from his office, saying, "You're getting close to the price where I might say yes." Lincoln sent the person
away before the offers became too tempting because Lincoln preferred not to have the choice between his integrity and a truly tempting offer. Perhaps Lincoln's case is merely one of shifting
preferences. It is also possible, however, that Lincoln valued his integrity and the bribe money,
and sending the man out of his office was a way of saying that he valued the choice between
them less than he valued either. As Lincoln did in this story, people may follow a strategy of
hand-tying to avoid Sophie's Choice situations. Such a strategy will not always be effective, however.
27. The metaphor Schelling presents to illustrate hand tying is of two trucks driving toward
each other on a narrow road. One will have to pull off the road to let the other pass. If one truck
driver-in plain view of the other-removes his steering wheel and throws it out the window, he
sends a message to the other that he is powerless to pull over. Provided the other driver does not
follow the same tactic, this form of hand-tying may be effective to force the other side to make a
concession. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLiCT (1960). In Sophie's Choice situations, choosing not to choose will not always solve the problem, because inaction will have a
certain substantive outcome that itself becomes a choice. See infra note 40.
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D. Possible Causes of the Sophie's Choice Paradox
The Sophie's Choice paradox could arise from a number of causes. Understanding the possible causes of the paradox is important because the legal
and nonlegal response could turn on our beliefs about the dynamic underlying
the paradox. The possible causes of the paradox appear to be threefold: first,
the costs of commensurating may be too high for some people, so that choosing between things is prohibitively difficult; second, people may know that
they value alternatives equally and the pain of choosing comes from treating
equals differently; third, choice may be undesirable for people who cannot or
will not take responsibility for their decisions.
1. Incommensurability
Sophie's Choice may be caused by the fact that the chooser does not
know whether she prefers the proposal to the status quo. The costs of commensuration-that is, of comparing the values of the options-are very
high.' The chooser does know, however, that both alternatives are crucially
important and she does not want to give up the more valued thing. Opportunity costs loom large as she starts to choose either option.'
This difficulty in sorting preferences has also been noted by Gerald
Dworkin.'
He in turn quotes at length a passage by Tibor Scitovsky:
If, beginning with a situation in which only one kind of shirt were
available, a man was transposed to another in which ten different
kinds were offered to him, including the old kind, he could of course
continue to buy the old kind of shirt. But it does not follow that, if he
elects to do this, he is no worse off in the new situation. In the first
place, he is aware that he is now rejecting nine different kinds of
shirts whose qualities he has not compared. The decision to ignore
the other nine shirts is itself a cost.'
This overload of alternatives leads, Dworkin argues, to what Kierkegaard
called the "despair of possibility": in it "the soul goes astray in possibility."32
2. Treating Equals Differently
It is also possible that the pain of Sophie's Choice stems from its requirement that the chooser treat equals differently. Sophie might recoil from choosing between her children not so much because their relative values are hard to

28. See Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE LJ. 56
(1993); Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REv. 779, 799
(1994) (Sophie's dilemma "is tragic partly because the two lives are not fungible").
29. This concept is similar to Guido Calabresi's theory of "tragic choices." GtJDo
CALABRESi & PHInIP BOBBrrr, TRAGIC CHOICES 24-26 (1978).
30. DWORKIN, supra note 22, at 72 (stating that "the possibility of increased choices can
affect (for the worse) the original situation").
31. TIBOR SClTOVSKY, THE JOYLESS ECONOMY 98 (1976) (quoted in DWORKIN, supra note
22, at 72).
32. SOREN KIERKEGAARD, FEAR AND TREMBLING AND THE SICKNESS UNTO DEATH 169
(Walter Lowrie trans., 2d ed. 1954) (1843) (quoted in DWORKIN,supra note 22, at 73.
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discern, but because she knows with certainty that she values them equally.
Being forced to choose between them requires disparate treatment of children
she loves and values equally, robbing her of any rational basis for decision.
3. Taking Responsibility
The third possible cause of the Sophie's Choice paradox stems from the
costs of taking responsibility. It may be that Sophie eschews choice not so
much because she is in doubt about her preferences, but because she cannot
stand to be held accountable for her preferences. 33 The fear of accountability
is a terrible trap, of course, because Sophie is in a no-win situation: she will
feel great sadness and guilt whether or not she acts.
Sophie does not want to take responsibility for her choice or for choosing. 34 Gerald Dworkin points to responsibility as one of the primary reasons
that some people might prefer fewer choices:
At the most fundamental level, responsibility arises when one acts to
bring about changes in the world as opposed to letting fate or change
or the decisions of other actors determine the future. Indeed, once I
am aware that I have a choice, my failure to choose now counts
against me. I now can be responsible, and be held responsible, for
events that prior to the possibility of choosing were not attributable to
me. And with the fact of responsibility comes the pressure (social and
legal) to make 'responsible' choices.35
"[M]ore choices bring in their train more responsibility," Dworkin argues, and
"these are costs that must be taken into account. ' 36 Avoiding that responsibility is quite desirable to many people.
For example, at least one court has recognized that it is the exercise of

33. It is not clear, however, that fear of responsibility necessarily drives the paradox of
Sophie's Choice. Given the highly coercive context in which Sophie makes her choice, it is hard
to say that she bears the slightest responsibility for it. One might def'ne responsibility in a way
that makes clear that Sophie lacked it. John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza say that "moral
responsibility requires the freedom to pursue alternative courses of action" and "an agent is morally responsible only if he has the power freely to bring about one event, and he has the power
freely to bring about some alternative event." John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza, Introduction
to PERSPECTIVES ON MORAL REsPONSIBturrl 8 (John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza eds., Cornell U. Press 1993). Sophie's choice may bring about the saving of her son's life at the expense of
her daughter, but one cannot say that Sophie "freely" brought about those events. One might argue, then, that the highly immoral baseline at work in Sophie's case should eliminate any sense of
responsibility on her part and thereby remove the Sophie's Choice paradox. But this is apparently
not enough for Sophie.
34. In the situations discussed so far, the doctor has always been the one proposing the
alternatives to Sophie. But suppose that the doctor tells Sophie he will kill her son if Sophie fails
to make a counteroffer (such as "take my daughter instead"). Should Sophie feel responsible for
not offering? As long as she feels some uncertainty about whether the doctor would have accepted
her girl instead of the boy, would Sophie feel responsible for choosing not to offer the girl? Most
Sophies in that circumstance would not feel responsible for the boy's death if they faded to make
the suggested counteroffer. But this lack of responsibility on Sophie's part is not a necessary conclusion; it may simply be contingent on the way society is currently organized. Sophie might feel
that she should offer her own life. It is worth considering what distinguishes her own self-sacrifice
from offering to sacrifice the life of her child. See supra note 12.
35. DwoRKIN, supra note 22, at 67.
36. Id. at 68.
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choice that gives rise to responsibility, rather than the particular substantive act
involved. In Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown College,3" the court ruled that a Jehovah's Witness could be given a life-saving
blood transfusion without consenting to it. The court reasoned that the decision
did not impair the patient's religious freedom because moral responsibility
could arise only from a choice, which the patient had not exercised.'
A number of philosophers have suggested the hypothesis that action cre-

ates a stronger sense f responsibility for consequences than inaction does,
even when the consequences of inaction are dire.39 They consider two
hypotheticals involving a runaway trolley car. In the first hypothetical, the
trolley's current path will cause it to kill one person. If the subject chooses to
switch the trolley's path to an alternate track, the trolley will kill five people.
Most philosophers assert that it would be moral to keep the trolley on its
present course. In the second hypothetic d, the runaway trolley will kill five
people on its present course. If the subject switches the track, however, the
trolley will kill only one person. Surprisingly, most philosophers say that it
would not be moral to switch tracks. Apparently people's intuition is that
switching the track in Case A would create responsibility for the deaths of five
people, but that failing to switch the track in Case B would not give rise to the
same responsibility, even though the result would be the same--the deaths of
five people.
The crucial point from the trolley example is that people seem to feel less
responsible if they remain inactive and fail to change the status quo than if
they act and move away from the default.' If this is true, and if the avoidance of responsibility is an important cause of the Sophie's Choice paradox,
then Styron's version of the choice (involving a penalty default) was particularly cruel. Inaction-the alternative that would ordinarily make people feel
less responsible for the outcome-would actually result in the deaths of both
Jan and Eva. The doctor made the default so unpalatable that he drove Sophie
to take action--creating in her a greater sense of responsibility.
E. Consequences
Given these possible causes of the Sophie's Choice paradox, strategies to
avoid it will meet varying levels of success. Responses to the paradox will be
both individual and collective. Strategies that work for individuals may require
some governmental support.

37. 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
38. See DwoRKIN,supra note 22, at 68 n.10 (stating that "it was the choice of blood, not the
blood itself, that was forbidden") (emphasis added).
39. ERic RAKowsKi, EQUAL JusTicE 344-47 (1991); Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Trolley
Problem, 94 YALE L.J. 1395, 1395-97 (1985).

40. Again, to the extent people feel less responsible for inaction than they do for action, we
should see such intuitions as social constructs rather than anything inherent. It might be possible
to reframe situations so that people would feel equally responsible for what they do and (in the
words of the Roman Catholic confession) what they "have failed to do."
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1. Individual Responses to the Sophie's Choice Paradox
Individual responses could fall into three categories: coin flipping, refusing to decide, and hand-tying. The effectiveness of such strategies might turn
on which of the three causes discussed above seems to be most at work.
a. Coin Flipping
For some but certainly not all people, coin flipping might be a sufficient
solution. Coin flipping could help the person who avoids choice because she
does not know which alternative she prefers. The coin flip gives such a person
a basis for deciding when her own preferences are unclear. Similarly, coin
flipping could ease the paradox for a person who avoids choice because he
dislikes treating equals differently. By subjecting both alternatives to the coin
flip, he treats them equally, at least procedurally, and the equal treatment of
the coin flip then becomes the basis for disparate substantive treatment."
For the person who knows her preferences but wants not to take responsibility for them, on the other hand, coin flipping would be a less effective
solution. Eventually, such a person would have to take action, and that seems
to be the source of the pain. Even for those who dislike responsibility, however, the coin flip might be a useful scapegoat. For people who have a preference but are afraid to act upon it, a coin flip that comes out the right way
could grant "permission" to follow the true preference. Even if the coin flip
leads away from the person's true preference, the coin flip might help, because
by preventing the person from acting upon her true preference (for which she
does not want to take responsibility) the coin flip might absolve her sense of
responsibility even more completely.
b. Refusing to Decide
Another way to respond to the paradox is to simply refuse to decide.
Sophie attempted this approach before she was coerced into her decision.
Sophie might even have precommitted to this strategy if she had foreseen the
doctor's horrible proposal and been able in some literal way to implement her
internal wish ("Let me be struck dumb"). The problem, however, is that refusing to decide is, in a way, deciding. In the case of the penalty default, it is
deciding to permit that penalty to be exacted. In Sophie's case, refusing to
choose would have been a decision that both children would die. In the altered
version of the case, refusing to choose would have been a decision to forego
the "opportunity" that the doctor's proposal offered-saving her son.

41. Some people might care so much more about substantive treatment than procedure that
they would find the equality of the coin flip somewhat hollow. See Richard Warner, Topic in
Jurisprudence: Incommensurability as a Jurisprudential Puzzle, 68 Clu.-KENT L. REV. 147
(1992). "It is not even possible for her to rationally decide by, for example, flipping a coin; to do
so is to count saving the life of one as reason to choose that the other should die." Id. at 154.
42. Lois Shepherd, Sophie's Choices: Medical and Legal Responses to Suffering, 72 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 103, 103 (1996) ("Rather than choose one of her children over the other, Sophie
could have rejected such a choice altogether.").
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Refusing to decide in the original version might help the person who
cannot choose because she does not know which she prefers. Because the
penalty default results in the deaths of both children, Sophie avoids a passive
choice between them. In the altered version, however, the refusal to decide
will result in the death of one but not both children. Refusing to decide in
such a case is, in fact, a decision that one child will die, and will not help the
person who avoids choice because she does not know which of the alternatives
she prefers.
Similarly, for the person who knows that she values the alternatives equally and wishes not to decide between them, refusing to decide might be an
effective solution to the paradox in the original but not the altered version of
the case. In the original case, refusing to decide has an equal impact on the
two children, and thus would assure Sophie that she treated equals the same.
In the altered case, refusing to decide might be a procedurally neutral stance
and might satisfy some who avoid choice because they wish not to treat equals
differently. But for those who value substance more than procedure, refusing
to decide in the altered case will not solve the paradox, because they will
recognize the decision they are passively making by refusing to decide.
For those who dislike choice because they wish to avoid responsibility,
refusing to decide might appear to be an effective solution. Intuitively, it appears to avoid action and the sense of responsibility that comes with action.
But as suggested above the heightened sense of responsibility that flows from
action as a opposed to inaction may be merely a social construct. For those
who see beyond the construct, refusing to decide will be an ineffective solution to the problem of responsibility for choice."3
The more certain the result of choosing (or refusing to choose), the greater the sense of responsibility that might settle on the chooser. When the default is clear (when, in Sophie's case for example, refusing to choose means
that both children will certainly die), refusing to choose will be a substantive
as well as a procedural decision. Sophie will know the substantive consequences of refusing to decide. If, on the other hand, the default is not clear,
then refusing to decide may become more like a coin flip, a procedural choice,
not a substantive one.
c. Hand-tying
A third individual response to the Sophie's Choice problem is hand-tying-a particularly strong refusal to decide which involves precommitments
not to choose. Like the refusal to choose asserted at decision time, hand-tying
may help the person who does not know her preferences and the person who
dislikes treating equals differently." But hand-tying may not be an effective
strategy for those who wish to avoid responsibility, because while hand-tying
appears to be a purely procedural strategy, it cannot completely mask the sub-

43. This will be true in either the original or the altered case, but will be particularly painful
in the presence of the penalty default.
44. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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stantive choice that will at least passively be made.45
Hand-tying may be a particularly ineffective strategy for people with
"second order" Sophie's Choice preferences. Such people prefer not only to
avoid the substantive choice (son versus daughter), but also the procedural
choice (whether or not to choose). If they have to decide whether or not to tie
their own hands, they will face this second order Sophie's Choice problem,
and that too will cause them significant disutility. It may be difficult, moreover, to elicit information about whether people have first and second order
Sophie's Choice preferences. When people don't want to make choices, they
probably won't even want to talk about whether or not they want to choose.
For such people, it may be better not to give them a choice about whether to
choose.'
2. Governmental Responses to the Sophie's Choice Paradox
The Sophie's Choice paradox presents no less than a new rationale for
restricting freedom of contract. This raises, then, the thorny problem of policy:
should the government step in to restrict choice, and if so, how? I will address
each of these questions in turn.
Even if Sophie's Choice preferences exist, we might not want government
to respond because we might fear any rationale that would give a bad government another basis for restricting freedom. We might legitimately fear that the
Sophie's Choice paradox would supply a pretext for restricting choice even in
cases where Sophie's Choice preferences are absent.
If we were confident that the government was a good one and would
restrict freedom of choice only in cases where Sophie's Choice preferences
seemed really to be at work, we would still face two important questions of
empiricism and methodology. First, how can even a good government know
when Sophie's Choice preferences are at work? And second, once such preferences are detected, how should the government decide between the alternatives so as to relieve the individual of such choice?
a. Detecting Sophie's Choice Preferences
Sophie's Choice preferences may be particularly difficult to smoke out.
As noted above, people who wish not to choose may not even want to discuss
the alternatives, and thus government will have difficulty knowing whether
they prefer one or all of those alternatives to choosing between them. Moreover, if people know that government is exploring the public's preferences to

45. When the default or the substantive consequences of refusing to decide are uncertain,
however, hand-tying takes on a very different character from the role it played in the case of

Ulysses, where the consequences of hand-tying were clear. In such a case the substantive aspects
of the passive choice may fall away.
46. For example, in the case of the crowded lifeboat, see supra note 20 and accompanying
text, it might be better if the Titanic captain simply chooses which child to include in the lifeboat
rather than giving Sophie the choice between her children. It might also be better for the captain
to choose rather than giving Sophie the choice about whether or not she wants to choose between
her children.
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determine whether their freedom of choice should be" restricted, they might
also understand that the retention of a future choice may turn on their responses. This may cause their responses to become an implicit choice about
whether or not they wish to choose in the future. In other words, asking people whether they have Sophie's Choice preferences in effect is asking them
whether they want to choose at some point in the future. If people have second order Sophie's Choice preferences, they might not want even to decide
whether to decide, and will resist the government's probing for that reason.
For these reasons, it may be difficult for the government accurately to detect
Sophie's Choice preferences.
b. Responding to Sophie's Choice Preferences
When the government does manage to find Sophie's Choice preferences,
it will have to decide what to do about them. One option, of course, is to
refrain from action altogether, and leave the problem to private, individual
solutions, as outlined above. A second option would be to act only as an enforcer. The government might allow for private solutions and step in only to
facilitate those strategies, by, for example, enforcing coin flip results or handtying commitments.' A third response to the Sophie's Choice paradox would
resemble a strategy in certain situations when people cannot contract for themselves: government could try to predict what people would choose if forced to
do so and simply make that choice for them.
In Sophie's Choice situations, the governmental choice would become an
immutable rule in order to relieve people of any decision making.' In cases
where individuals have strong form Sophie's Choice preferences, the
government's job would be relatively easy. Any of the alternatives would be
preferable to choosing between them, and government would increase welfare
no matter which alternative were selected. If the Sophie's Choice preferences
are manifest only in weak form, on the other hand, the government's job becomes more challenging, because individuals might prefer a choice to at least
one of the alternatives. If the government selects one of the dispreferred alternatives, it will make those people worse off.
When the government tries to predict which alternative people would
choose, however, it faces formidable informational problems. Just as people
might be unwilling to discuss their preference not to have a choice, they will
often be unwilling or unable to reveal their preferences among the proffered
alternatives. Sometimes, even if the government accurately predicts people's
choices (if forced to choose) it cannot rely upon those predictions to determine
people's true preferences. To see how this might be true, consider again the
hypothetical in which a parent must decide which of her children to send to
Harvard. Suppose that the parent is an ardent and very public feminist. If

47. If the government chooses this response, it must be aware that coin flipping and handtying will not be effective in all cases, because some causes of Sophie's Choice preferences will
not be addressed by these responses.
48. If the government's choice were merely a default rule that people could contract around,
they would again be faced with a decision and the Sophie's Choice problem would persist.
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forced to choose, she will select her daughter out of concern for her public
image and the message her choice will send. Her preferences with respect to
the alternatives she might choose, then, are as follows: G. > B. where G, is
the girl if chosen by her parent and B. is the boy if chosen by his parent. In
her heart of hearts, however, the parent might actually prefer that her son go
to Harvard. If someone else could choose (and thus absolve her of responsibility), the parent's preferences might be as follows: B. > G. where B. is the boy
if chosen by someone else (and thus unchosen by the parent) and G. is the girl
if chosen by someone else. The government's task would be uncovering these
underlying preferences, but knowing what the parent would choose if forced to
do so will not necessarily illuminate that question. And of course asking the
parent her true preferences will not work either, because declaring them is the
same as choosing, and would lead back to the girl-not the parent's true pref49
erence.
A final governmental response to the possibility of Sophie's Choice preferences would require the government to reconsider the kinds of choices it
presents to its citizens. The Sophie's Choice paradox might expand the range
of cases that are deemed to create unconstitutional conditions. As Bill Marshall has argued, it is the pain caused by choosing between two dearly held
values, as in the case where the employer gave employees a "choice" between
job benefits and the exercise of their religion, that gives rise to unconstitutional conditions." The Sophie's Choice paradox may explain a class of unconstitutional condition cases in which the government's right to do a larger thing
(declining to offer employees certain benefits) does not create a right to do the
smaller thing (denying a particular employee benefits based upon his refusal to
work on Saturday). This "smaller" thing the government proposes to do may
impose a choice, and thus actually impose an intolerable burden.
HI.

THE FALLACY OF CONSENSUAL EQUIVOCATION

Wertheimer concedes that "a woman's decision to serve as a surrogate
may not be appropriately consensual" if the woman makes a "cognitive error"
and agrees to a transaction she "will regret or would regret if she thought
objectively about its effect on her life."'" But Wertheimer rejects this as a
justification for making surrogacy agreements unenforceable. He says:
[D]o not say that a woman's judgment cannot be appropriately consensual just because she cannot fully anticipate what it will be like to
give up the child. People can voluntarily consent to sterilizations, sex
change operations, abortions, and plastic surgery, and (shall we add?)
marriage-where one cannot or frequently does not have any experi-

49. One might say that the parent is merely the victim of competing preferences in this case;
feelings about her children's college education conflict with feelings about feminism and her public stance on women's issues. This may be true, but it does not mean that the parent's choices, if
forced to choose, would be irrational. The ordering of chosen preferences, even if different from
the true preferences, could be rational given the full range of the parent's concerns.
50. Marshall, supra note 17, at 249-51.
51. Wertheimer, Surrogacy, supra note 2, at 1223.
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ence with the consequences of the decision. By comparison with
some such decisions that we do allow, the problem of miscalculation
in surrogacy may be relatively small and more amenable to preventative measures .. 52
The problems with Wertheimer's assertion are twofold: first, his assertion is
based upon questionable empirics, because pregnancy and childbirth may be
significantly different from the transformative processes he cites; second, by
treating consent monolithically--assuming that various kinds of consent are
comparable-he commits what he calls the "fallacy of equivocation." '
The empirical problems with Wertheimer's argument stem from the fact
that pregnancy and childbirth may be more transformative than the other
processes he discusses. Pregnancy and childbirth alone combine two key
elements of transformation: physical change intertwined with social, relational
change. Marriage brings no bodily changes. Plastic surgery, sterilizations, and
sex change operations do not by definition involve another human being in the
process. Abortions involve another life (whether a person or not is immaterial
for this discussion), but not in an ongoing way, because the abortion causes
that other life to end. Indeed, in my view, pregnancy and childbirth are so
transformative that the person who emerges from the process can in a very
real sense be said to be a different person from the one who entered the process.
Pregnancy and childbirth involve dramatic physical changes in the woman.5" Systemic hormonal shifts may change her affect and mood. Her brain
may change in size and perhaps in function." In the course of the pregnancy
and childbirth, she will grow and shed a whole new organ-the placenta.
These same hormonal changes will cause her muscles to relax, her joints to
loosen, and her bones to change calcium content.56 She may increase her
body weight by 30%."
She will change emotionally throughout the pregnancy and post-partum
period. The same hormones that change her body will also alter the way she
thinks and feels about the world. In some women, these changes are so dramatic that a disease has been named to embody them: post-partum depression.
Pregnancy and childbirth will leave marks on her body.5" Her pigmenta-

52. Id.
53. Wertheimer, Remarks, supra note 2, at 892.
54. Some physical changes caused by pregnancy are trivial, such as increased growth of hair
and fingernails, but signal the overwhelming alteration of a woman's physical functions.
55. Health Watch I Brain Shrinkage and Pregnancy, NEWSDAY, Jan. 14, 1997, at B32 (reporting that a team of British radiologists and anesthetists found that the brains of women they
tested shrank in late pregnancy and took up to six months to regain their full size).
56. All of these changes are cited in ARLENE EISENBERG, Er AL., WHAT TO EXPECT WHEN
You'RE EXPECTING 100-255 (1991), the veritable "bible" for pregnancy and childbirth.
57. The usual guidelines for pregnancy weight gain suggest that most women gain 25-40
pounds. Id. at 147-48.
58. These external changes alone would probably not be sufficient transformation to create
discontinuous selves, but the long and almost universal tradition of using outward marking (piercing, tattooing, cutting, or painting the body) to signal internal change could make these alterations
significant.
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tion may change, causing the so called "pregnancy mask" or a characteristic
dark line that sometimes runs vertically along the woman's abdomen away
from the navel. Whether she delivers vaginally or by a cesarean section, she is
likely to suffer tears, incisions, and/or stitches. She may gain "stretch marks"
as her skin strains to contain her growing uterus.
Most importantly, perhaps, the woman will be changed socially and
relationally. She will be forever redefined in terms of at least one other human
being. She will add mother to the list of many social roles she plays. Even if
she loses or surrenders the child, this change of role will be indelible. She
may think of the child often, especially on his or her birthday. 9 She may be
forced to acknowledge her relationship to the child if she or the child develops
a disease that might be congenital or for which treatment might require blood
or bone marrow from a genetically related person.'
Any one of these physical, emotional, or social changes might not individually justify a conclusion that the person undergoing them has been transformed, but in combination they could very well have that effect.
Ordinarily, a person can only be contractually bound if she or her agent
binds her. If the dramatic changes wrought by pregnancy and childbirth do
cause some discontinuity of self, then we must seriously question whether the
prepregnant woman is the same as-or even a faithful agent for-the mother.
Wertheimer notes that "[riespect for a person's autonomy sometimes requires that we respect choices that reflect values that she presently accepts,
even if we are rightly worried about the way she acquires those values."6'
This would seem to respond to the argument that a surrogate may have entered the contract for bad reasons, because she is brainwashed, or because she
suffers from some "false consciousness" of her role in the world. Wertheimer
does not tell us what should happen if a brainwashed person enters into a
contract and then, preperformance, comes to her senses. We cannot say, as
Wertheimer does, that at the point the contract is to be enforced the woman
"presently accepts" the values reflected in her earlier choice.
Wertheimer argues that "the ability to enter into a binding agreement is
itself a crucial dimension of one's autonomy and.., the 'unenforceable
contract'62 solution will deter" some contracting. "[I1n trying to protect women from having to surrender a child against her strong maternal desires," he
says, "we do not express the appropriate respect for women as autonomous
and responsible persons."63 Here he cites Carmel Shalev, who disapprovingly

59. I know a woman who bore and gave up a child for adoption. On the child's birthday
each year, a close friend of the woman would send her a rose for every year the child had been
alive.
60. 1 know a woman who was adopted at birth but came to know her biological parents
when her biological father became ill. The biological parents contacted my friend because the
illness could be genetically transmitted and if my friend tested positive for the gene, she would be
advised to take immediate precautionary steps to prevent the disease.
61. Wertheimer, Surrogacy, supra note 2, at 1226.
62. The consequences of declaring the surrogacy agreement an "unenforceable contract" are
not entirely clear. If it is "unenforceable" it could simply be voidable but not void, that is, unenforceable at the option of the mother.
63. Wertheimer, Surrogacy, supra note 2, at 1226.
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paraphrases the arguments of her opponents this way: "Her state of mind at
the moment of agreement is not to be taken seriously because it is subject to
change during the performance of her undertaking, due to the nature of pregnancy. The insinuation is that it is unreasonable to expect her to keep her
promise because her faculty of reason is suspended by the emotional facets of
her biological constituency."
But to say that the nrenregnant woman cannot bind the mother is not to
denigrate the reasoning of either person. If we see a discontinuity in the self,
we do not view either of the selves as particularly feeble or disabled by emotion. Rather, we recognize that their preference structures are fundamentally
different and respecting the autonomy of the later, post-partum self requires
that we lessen the power of the prepregnancy self. The prepregnant woman
retains autonomy, but only over herself and only for as long as she exists.
With the onset of pregnancy, and certainly in the wake of delivery, she ceases
to exist. To make her agreement binding is to give her more than autonomy; it
actually gives her power over another.
The decision to make the agreement of the prepregnant woman
nonbinding on the mother cannot rest on a belief that pregnancy and childbirth
somehow disable a woman's powers of reason. We would be voiding the
decision of the person who existed prior to pregnancy, so it can't be the pregnancy that makes the woman's agreement suspect. Indeed, by allowing pregnant or post-partum women to void surrogacy contracts, we would be honoring
their decisions when they occupy the position that is traditionally most vulnerable, when they are performing their most gender-specific role. Moreover, by
voiding the surrogacy contract we would not declare all of the woman's decisions suspect, but only those that relate specifically to the nature of the relationship between mother and child.
Also, recognizing a discontinuity of self does not necessarily mean that
rights of parenthood are inalienable. What it suggests, instead, is that when the
surrogacy contract is formed, the mother of the specific child in issue is not
yet present to alienate her parental rights. The woman who enters the surrogacy contract is a different person and cannot alienate the rights of another. The
post-partum mother, however, is free to alienate her own rights. This means
only that the woman cannot relinquish her parental rights until after the child
is born.'

64.

CARMEL SHALEv, BIRTH POwER 121 (1989).

65. I should say a word about remedies. If discontinuity of self wipes out consent, then a
.......
performance remedies nor
"-uld
Lfwar i woman who reneges on a surrogacy contract w
damages. It is curious, perhaps, that specific performance is often sought and awarded in surrogacy cases. Standard contract doctrine would not provide specific performance to enforce a contract
for personal services. And if a court will not force someone to sing at the Met, why should it
force a woman to surrender her child? Perhaps the surrogacy contract is viewed more as a contract
for goods than for services. But this commodification of the child seems highly objectionable.
Perhaps- enforcement of the contract would seem less harsh if the mother simply paid damages to
compensate for her breach. This might prevent unjust enrichment when the other party to the
contract has been paying the woman's expenses. Damages might also include "expectation" damages to try to give the other party the benefit of the bargain, but the calculation of such damages
might prove impossible. Moreover, given the economic straights of many women who enter surrogacy contracts, having to pay damages to the other side might be so threatening that they would
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My thesis, then, is that the changes wrought by pregnancy and childbirth
might be fundamental enough that they should cause us to question whether-at least for the purposes of this particular contract-the
prepregnant/precontractual self can be considered the same person as or agent
for the mother. If we see an important discontinuity of identity in a woman
going through pregnancy and childbirth, and we lack a good theory of agency
to-bind the contracting self to the self against whom the contract is to be enforced, this could create serious problems for consent, for it seems axiomatic
in contract law that a person must be a party to the contract to be bound by it.
Wertheimer argues that we can address the problem of discontinuity by
allowing only women who have already been pregnant and given birth to serve
as surrogates, because they are more likely to know the likely effects of pregnancy and childbirth: "the problem of miscalculation in surrogacy may be
relatively small and more amenable to preventative measures: restricting surrogacy to women who have given birth and therefore have personal knowledge
of the bonding process . . ."6 This is not a complete solution to the problem, however. No two pregnancies or childbirth experiences are exactly the
same, and the transformative effects of a first pregnancy could be more limited than subsequent pregnancies. Certainly medical evidence abounds that
second or third pregnancies affect women's bodies differently from first pregnancies.67 The labor and delivery may proceed very differently, the child that
emerges will be different from the first child, and it may be impossible for a
woman to predict how she will respond to that specific child.' Furthermore,
because the changes wrought by pregnancy and childbirth as so importantly
social and relational, we must be sensitive to the differences between first and
subsequent births in this dimension. The birth of the second child affects not
only the woman but also her existing child or children-with whom the woman is so fundamentally connected that changes in their lives will cause changes
in her life as well. Knowing how the first child affected her may reveal little
of how subsequent children will affect her. Thus, Wertheimer's solution (followed by some agencies handling these arrangements) that only second-time
mothers be permitted to serve as surrogates is not always going to work. The
transformative impact of pregnancy and childbirth will in many cases undermine our confidence in the continuity of self.
The second problem with Wertheimer's argument about surrogacy stems
from a potential inconsistency with his second article in this Symposium. In
Remarks on Coercion and Exploitation, Wertheimer describes what he calls
the "fallacy of equivocation":
the meaning of coercion assumed by the major premise is not identi-

feel coerced into giving up the child. In any case, giving damages rather than specific performance
might provide little relief to the woman seeking to avoid the surrogacy agreement.
66. Wertheimer, Surrogacy, supra note 2, at 1223.
67. EISENBERG, Er AL., supranote 56, at 21-22.
68. If I may indulge in a brief autobiographical note, here, I would say that my five weekold daughter is quite different from her older brother. I felt different during the pregnancy, the
labor and delivery were different, and Anna's behavior from birth has been a contrast to her
brother's. Knowing how it felt to become the mother of my son has turned out to tell me very
little about how it would feel to become the mother of my daughter.
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cal to the meaning of coercion in the minor premise, and thus the
conclusion does not follow even though both the major and minor
premise may be true (given different meanings of the word).'
Similarly, it may be true that women consent to surrogacy contracts. It may
also be true that people consent to marriage, sex change operations, sterilizations and plastic surgery. But the fact that we make consent binding in these
latter contexts does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that a woman's
consent to surrogacy should make that contract binding. By arguing that consent to surrogacy is comparable to consent in the context of marriage, surgery,
or abortion, Wertheimer confuses two different normative consequences of
consent, and thus himself unwittingly commits a fallacy of equivocation.
Wertheimer's point is that in many other situations we allow consent to be
binding despite the fact that the consenter lacks experience and does
not/cannot know what life will be like after the event or process has occurred.
That much is true. We do allow people to commit themselves to undertakings
that are great, even though they may have difficulty measuring the change in
their lives that such a commitment will entail. The problem is that consent will
have different effects in different contexts, but Wertheimer groups all kinds of
consent together. One sort of consent, for example, may be sufficient to insulate other actors from tort liability. This is the sort of consent involved in the
context of plastic surgery or sex change operations. But, the consent sufficient
to insulate doctors from tort liability would not suffice to bind a patient to undergo the surgery if he or she hesitated at the eleventh hour.
Wertheimer's examples are also inapposite because they are, in the main,
irreversible processes. Once the scalpel hits the skin, consent to the surgery is
irrevocable, at least where the knife cuts. But until that point, the patient can
withdraw consent. In cases of surrogacy, until she actually surrenders her
baby, the surrogate mother is like a patient who has not yet felt the surgeon's
knife. As long as the process is reversible, we do not bind the party or patient
to her earlier consent and force her to go through with it.
And much like marriage and some forms of sterilization," surrogacy is
reversible. After the baby is born the mother could still change her mind to
prevent irrevocable consequences. Just as we allow men to reverse their vasectomies and we allow couples to divorce, so too we should permit women to
escape surrogacy commitments."
IV. CONCLUSION
Of the two responses I have made to Wertheimer, the discontinuous self
may be the less radica. Certainly it presents a less dramatic challenge to freedom of contract than Sophie's Choice does. The implications of the discontin-

69. Wertheimer, Remarks, supra note 2, at 892.
70. Some vasectomies may be reversed--consent is not binding for all time.
71. In conversation, Wertheimer has said that consent to join the military might be a better
example. There, a person can't get out, even though the commitment is in theory reversible. But
the government and national security may present special cases. It is difficult to see that a party
seeking enforcement of surrogacy can advance anything like the global security interests that rest
with the military.
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uous self are consistent with standard contract doctrine regarding the identity
of parties to be bound by a contract. Sophie's Choice, on the other hand,
undermines more fundamentally a bedrock assumption of much of contract
doctrine-that more choice is better than less.
On the other hand, the discontinuous self could have implications that are
further reaching than at first appear. The concept could spill over into cases
where parties wishing to be excused from contract have survived any number
of transformative experiences-violent crime, war, serious illness, near-fatal
accident, mass disaster, or addiction (drugs or alcohol). We might find that
"real world" examples of discontinuity are easier to find than examples of
Sophie's Choice. Sophie's Choice preferences are difficult to detect, precisely
because people with such preferences often wish to not discuss their preferences. If Sophie's Choice arises only in a very narrow set of circumstances, its
deeper challenge may appear only rarely. In conversation, Wertheimer has
suggested that Sophie's Choice may be only a "curioso," and if it is sufficiently rare he may be right. Perhaps we should hope that the Sophie's Choice
paradox is merely a curioso. If it turns out to be more common, it could undermine much of contract and economic theory.72
As I write this conclusion, I am taking breaks to breastfeed my 5 weekold daughter. I first read the materials for this Symposium when I was well
into the third trimester of this pregnancy. Perhaps I can be forgiven, then, for
bringing to the subject matter some subjectivity. Perhaps my ideas about
Sophie's Choice and the discontinuity of self say more about my own intellectual and emotional state right now than they do about Wertheimer's ideas.
When my hormones return to "normal," whatever that is, and my brain has
expanded to its ordinary size, perhaps I will regret these remarks. 3 But then
I may become Exhibit A in the case for the discontinuous self.

72.

For example, Kenneth Arrow's Impossibility Theorem posits that given five crucial as-

sumptions, there is no way to nonarbitrarily aggregate preferences. KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL
CHOICES & INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1952). Among the five assumptions is the axiom of the independence of irrelevant alternatives. The classic example used to illustrate this axiom presents a diner
who is told that dessert can be either chocolate or vanilla ice cream. If the diner chooses chocolate
and is then told by the waiter, "you can also have strawberry," it would violate the axiom if the

diner were then to switch to vanilla. Being given the additional choice of strawberry ice cream
should be "irrelevant" to whether the diner prefers chocolate to vanilla.
But consider Arrow's assumption in the face of strong Sophie's Choice preferences. If the
Nazi doctor initially says that Sophie must choose whether Jan should be killed or whether both
Jan and Eva should be killed, Sophie may say that only Jan should be killed. If the doctor then
presents an additional alternative, "you could also have only Eva killed," it is possible that Sophie
would be so pained by choosing between Jan and Eva that she would actually shift her choice
back to having both Jan and Eva killed. Sophie's Choice preferences may thus undermine the
seemingly innocuous assumption of the independence of irrelevant alternatives.
73. See Linda Ross Meyer, When Reasonable Minds Differ, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1467, 1467
n.*, 1521 n.210. In a wonderful sort of anti-cite, Meyer self-deprecatingly writes, "Insofar as I
suggested there were no difficulties with a positivist approach to qualified immunity doctrine in a
previous article-well-I was wrong. Don't see Meyer, supra note 131, at 480-81. Live and
learn." Id. at 1521 n.210.

